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STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL FACTS
The Court of Appeals in its decision has perhaps overlooked
a number of critical facts, attributable in part to the complex
nature of this case.

It is an exceedingly complicated matter.

Specifically , the Court of Appeals has more failed to recognize
the fact that the principal on the primary construction Note was
not paid out in full and in fact never disbursed.
1

In deed

that

breach is the source of the ultimate failure of the construction
project. The current language of the Opinion, for example, states:
"We hold that C.F. is entitled to recover principal loan and
interest accrued thereon, as provided in each of the three Notes,
from the respective Note Makers." See Page 6 of the Opinion. The
Court of Appeals has understandably overlooked the fact that the
principal on the construction loan was never lent out or disbursed
in full.

It certainly doe not make any sense to hold the

Defendants liable for money they never received. Indeed, it is the
understanding from counsel of the Appellant that the Respondents
are liable for all money on the Note whether received or not
received.

This clearly cannot be the holding of the Court of

Appeals.

Second, the Opinion on page 6 also states that "1. Appellees
were not entitled to recover damages for the breach of C.F."

In

fact, the Court had found that C.F. had breached the terms of the
Contract, but the price of a fully developed lot would be too
speculative.

It is clear from the evidence in the Memorandum

Decisions of Judge Raymond S. Uno that there should be damages, but
that the damages would be difficult to ascertain.

An appropriate

manner of dealing with this case would be to remand and allow for
additional testimony regarding some form of damages.

It is clear

that Markwest and Howard Hucks had been damaged and that an offset
should occur.

The Trial Court merely found that that was a

speculative amount. It would turn justice on its head if the quid
2

pro quo envisioned

by the Court in order to deal with the

speculative nature of the damages should overturned so as to ignore
one person's damages when they clearly exist, and reward the other
side because of the other side's misfortune in this regard.
Consequently, this matter should be remanded to the trial court for
further findings regarding the damages that the Hucks sustained.

In addition, the Opinion does not address the facts cited by
the Memorandum Decision of Judge Uno that Howard Hucks no longer
had

the

ability

Consequently,

the

to

legitimately

holding

in

seek

Utah

alternate

Farm

financing.

Production

Credit

Association vs. Cox: 627 P.2d 62 (Utah 1981) can be and should be
distinguished upon the grounds that it would be impossible for
Howard Hucks to have mitigated his damages by finding alternate
financing.

The Court of Appeals should therefore consider the

effect of someone in the position of Howard Hucks and Markwest, who
no longer having the ability to seek alternate financing, would
therefore be denied an offset for damages caused by a lender's
breach of an agreement.

Finally, the Opinion does not address the nature of the
overall financing scheme.

The notes were restricted by various

contingencies and conditions that were not met.

There were

additional agreements and conditions regarding these Notes which
have not been dealt with either in the Opinion or the Briefs, but
were dealt with by Judge Raymond S. Uno.
3

The Notes should be

viewed only in the context of these later agreements which modified
and made contingent their demand.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Respondent respectfully suggests to the Court of Appeals
that it may have overlooked the fact that its holding requires
Howard Hucks and Markwest to pay for all monies received on the
Notes and not merely the amounts that were disbursed.

The Court

of Appeals should certainly modify its holding to require only the
repayment of funds that were actually disbursed.

To do otherwise

would be a severe injustice.

Second, the Respondent would emphasize the fact that it was
found to have been damaged by C.F.'s breach of the Contract, but
that the Court did not feel obliged to deal with the uncertainties
and difficulties of ascertaining how much would have been recovered
on a sale of the property.

Certainly some fund would have, in

addition to what was received, at forecloser been produced from the
completion of the project.

The matter should be remanded to the

Court in order to determine what kind of damages should be provided
to offset whatever damages Commercial Finance may have.

Thirdly, Utah Farm Production Credit Association vs. Cox
should be distinguished on one essential element: The Respondents
Howard Hucks and Markwest were unable and it was impossible for
4

them to seek alternate financing under the circumstances.

The

Respondents should not be so severely penalized for not seeking
alternative financing when it is obvious under the circumstances
that that would be an utter and complete waste of time.

Fourth and finally, the Court of Appeals should re-evaluate
this extremely complex set of facts in the context of the various
contingencies and conditions established by the parties regarding
these Notes and duties of each of the parties.

These facts have

not been dealt with at any extent by the Opinion.

An adequate

regard for them may in fact change the Court's Opinion regarding
this matter.

ARGUMENT

I
THE APPELLANT COMMERCIAL FINANCE DID NOT
DISBURSE OR GIVE TO RESPONDENTS THE ENTIRE AMOUNT
OF THE NOTE AND THE RESPONDENTS CANNOT THEREFORE BE LIABLE
FOR MONIES THEY HAVE NEVER RECEIVED BECAUSE OF A
BREACH OF THE APPELLANT
This Argument is simply to emphasize the fact that the
Opinion, as it now stands, requires the Respondents to pay the
Appellants the full amount of the three (3) construction Notes, a
staggering sum, in spite of the fact that the Appellants never paid
the full amount of the Note.
Agreement by their

Appellant, infact, breached the

failure to pay beyond

a certain amount.

Communications from counsel for the Appellant have in fact conveyed

5

this fact but as Judge Uno pointed out on page 17 of his Memorandum
Decision "but in view of the foregoing facts, they cannot sue for
money that they never paid out." It is indeed an inappropriate and
injustate of facts if Commercial Finance is permitted to sue for
money that it never paid out and that it was breaching the terms
of a Contract and Agreement by not paying out.

They would doubly

have benefited from their wrongdoing.

Therefore, the Court of Appeals should require a remand to
determine what amounts were actually paid or to simply incorporate
what evidence was proffered as to what amounts were paid.

II
THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD REMAND THIS MATTER
TO DISCOVER WHAT HOWARD HUCKS' AND MARKWESTfS
DAMAGES ACTUALLY WERE
The nature of Judge Uno's Judgment, after he had reviewed all
the

facts

and

a

three-day

trial, amounted

to

finding

that

Commercial Finance had breached the Agreement and that Howard Hucks
and Markwest had been damaged.

They lost an entire development,

all chance for profits and any opportunity to pay off on these
Notes.

However, Judge Uno opted for a more equitable resolution

of the matter by finding that the amounts that may have been due
on the Notes were offset by the Appellant's breach.
solution to a complex problem.

A simple

However, it is clear that Howard

Hucks and Markwest were damaged by their inability to finish the
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project.

They would have had a greatly enhanced development

project available for sale if it could have been completed. It was
clear that it was in large part, Commercial Finance's fault for the
failure of it to be completed.
Markwest.
fact.

That has damaged Howard Hucks and

The current Opinion makes no accommodation for that

It would be just and appropriate that some account be given

to Markwest and Howard Hucks for the damages that they did receive.
The Trial Court was beset with an extremely difficult problem of
finding damages.

Testimony and evidence was presented by the

Respondents regarding prices and damages, but the Trial Court chose
to take another alternative.

The Respondents should not be

penalized because of the Trial Court's choice in remedies.

Finally, Commercial Finance would be able to benefit from
their improper behavior, and Howard Hucks and Markwest would be
victimized by Commercial Finance's unilateral decision to stop
giving funds to construction project, used to develop the property.
It is certainly undeniable that the value of the* property would
have been enhanced if construction would have continued, even if
profits may not have been found.

It is not speculative that the

value of the property would have been enhanced by continued work.
Therefore, justice requires that this matter be remanded to find
what the damages of Markwest and Howard Hucks would have been.
Otherwise, Commercial Finance would be rewarded for their wrongful
actions and Howard Hucks and Markwest will be stuck in a Catch22.
7

Ill
THE FAILURE TO FIND ALTERNATE FINANCING
IS EXCUSABLE WHEN IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO GET
ALTERNATE FINANCING
The rule in Utah Farm Production Credit Association vs. Cox
was basically that failure to seek alternate financing sources
preclude special damages, including loss profits, by the damaged
individual. The Respondents would point out that the evidence and
Memorandum Decision in that trial indicated that seeking alternate
financing would have amounted to tilting at windmills.

It is a

basic principal of contract law that a person should not be
required to carry out or attempt things that are impossible.

It

would be elevating form over substance to require Howard Hucks and
Markwest to seek alternate financing under these circumstances and
then arbitrarily impose a penalty on them for recognizing the
impossibility of seeking alternate financing.

Quite simply, the

Court should imply a requirement of reasonableness into seeking
alternate financing.

Evidence should be permitted upon remand to

find out whether a reasonable person would have pursued alternate
financing considering their dire financial circumstances.
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IV
THE DAMAGES IN THE COX CASE WERE SPECIAL DAMAGES,
THE DAMAGES IN THIS CASE INCLUDE DAMAGES NOT REQUIRING
SPECIAL DAMAGES
The Court of Appeals' Opinion includes in its decision the
position that, under Cox, a failure to pursue alternate financing
preclude special damages, including loss profits.

However, the

holding of the Appeals Court is overbroad in that it fails to
recognize that the damages of Markwest and Howard Hucks includes
damages that do not include profits. This means that Howard Hucks
and Markwest should be allowed to produce what the reasonable
market value of the property would have been if they were allowed
to complete it.

This would not include such amounts for damages

which may have been found by discovering very favorable buyers.
However, damages should include the reasonable increase in value
caused by the completion of the project.

That is clearly the

holding in Utah Farm Production Credit Association vs. Cox.

V
THE COURT OF APPEALS' OPINION DOES NOT CONSIDER
THE CONDITIONS AND CONTINGENCIES ESTABLISHED
BY THE PARTY REGARDING THE NOTES AND DISBURSEMENTS
The Court of Appeals' Opinion fails to take into count the
various conditions and contingencies agreed to by the parties over
the term of the construction and Note. Without this information,
it is unable to analyze the entire matter completely.
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The Trial

Court did in fact make a number of findings regarding this matter.

However, the Opinion simply deals with the blank aspects of
the Notes

and the breach by Commercial Finance,

A proper

disposition of this matter should be a remand that incorporates
what these conditions and contingencies were.

As it stands, the

Opinion by the Court of Appeals does not deal with these issues
whatsoever.

VI
CONCLUSION

The Respondents respectfully request that the Court of Appeals
set this matter for resubmittal and hearing upon the issues above
mentioned.

In the alternative, the Respondents request that that

the Opinion and holding modified to provide for a remand based upon
the points made by the Respondents above.

Specifically, the

Respondents request that the Court of Appeals remand to find what
amounts were actually disbursed, what the damages of Howard Hucks
and Markwest were.

Finally, the Respondent would request an

affirmation of the Judgment based upon the fact that it was
impossible for Markwest and Howard Hucks to find alternative
financing or that their damages, not including loss profits, would
exceed the value disbursed by Commercial Finance.
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CERTIFICATION OF COUNSEL FOR THE PETITIONER

Counsel for the Petitioner hereby certifies that this Petition
is presented in good faith and not for delay.

Respectfully submitted this J

day of October, 1990.

ZOLL & BRANCH
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Attorney for Respondents
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